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This lecture examines the causes of the global financial crisis, showing it was 
triggered by market failures, not by financial institution failures, and arguing that any 
regulatory framework for managing systemic risk must address markets as well as 
institutions. The lecture also analyzes how regulation should be designed under that 
broader framework to mitigate systemic risk and its consequences. Finally, the lecture 
examines the potential systemic effects of sovereign debt crises, demonstrating how 
regulation can mitigate those effects.
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INTRODUCTION 
  
Although banks and other financial institutions are important sources of 
capital, and although a chain of bank failures remains an important symbol 
of systemic risk, the ongoing trend towards disintermediation—or enabling 
companies to access the ultimate source of funds, the capital markets, 
without going through banks or other financial intermediaries—is making 
these failures less critical than in the past. Companies today are able to 
obtain most of their financing through the capital markets without the use of 
intermediaries. As a result, capital markets themselves are increasingly 
central to any examination of systemic risk. Systemic disturbances can erupt 
outside the banking system and spread through capital-market linkages, 
rather than merely through banking relationships.  
 
This has been dramatically illustrated by the global financial crisis. 
Although many think the crisis started with the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, the initial trigger was the collapse of the market for mortgage-
backed securities. A significant number of these securities were backed by 
subprime (or risky) home mortgages, which were expected to be refinanced 
through home appreciation. When home prices stopped appreciating, the 
borrowers could not refinance. In many cases, they defaulted. 
 
These defaults in turn caused substantial amounts of investment-grade 
rated securities backed by these mortgages to be downgraded and, in some 
cases, to default. Investors began losing confidence in these and other rated 
securities, and their market prices started falling.  
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Lehman Brothers, which held large amounts of mortgage-backed 
securities, was particularly exposed. Firms that had been doing business with 
Lehman—its „counterparties‟—began demanding additional safeguards, 
which Lehman could not provide. As a result, absent a bailout, Lehman 
could not continue doing business.  
 
The refusal of the U.S. Government to save Lehman Brothers, and 
Lehman‟s resulting bankruptcy, added to this cascade. Securities markets 
became so panicked that even the short-term commercial paper market 
virtually shut down, and the market prices of mortgage-backed securities 
collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the mortgage assets 
underlying those securities. {Give example of July 2008 Orion Finance SIV 
case in English High Court of Justice, in which I was an expert. Its 
mortgage-backed securities had a market value of around 22 cents/dollar, 
whereas the present value of its reasonably-expected cash flows would yield 
a value around 88 cents/dollar.}  
 
The cascade became a death spiral as banks and other financial 
institutions holding mortgage-backed securities had to write down their 
value under mark-to-market accounting rules, causing these institutions to 
appear more financially risky, in turn triggering widespread concern over 
counterparty risk. The high leverage of many firms, which effectively 
required fire-sales of assets, exacerbated the fall.  
 
Although governments have taken numerous steps to address the 
collapse, most of those steps have focused on institutions, not markets. Such 
a narrow focus worked well when banks and institutions were the primary 
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source of corporate financing. But as the financial crisis reveals, this focus is 
insufficient now that companies obtain much of their financing directly 
through capital markets.   
 
I believe that institutional systemic risk and market systemic risk should 
not be viewed each in isolation. Institutions and markets can both be triggers 
and transmitters of systemic risk.  
 
ANALYSIS  
 
How should we regulate systemic risk? This is a subset of the problem 
of regulating financial risk. Scholars argue that the primary if not sole 
justification for regulating financial risk is maximizing economic efficiency. 
Because systemic risk is a form of financial risk, efficiency should be a 
central goal in its regulation.  
 
Efficiency, however, has a somewhat unique added dimension in the 
context of systemic risk. Without regulation, the externalities caused by 
systemic risk would not be prevented or internalized because systemic risk 
pertains to risks to the financial system itself. Market participants are 
motivated to protect themselves but not necessarily to protect the system as a 
whole.  
 
As a result, there is a type of “tragedy of the commons,” a collective 
action problem in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources 
accrue to individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to 
maximize use of the resources, whereas the costs of exploitation, which 
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affect the real economy, are distributed among an even wider class of 
persons. Any regulation of systemic risk thus should focus not only on 
traditional efficiency but also on stability of the financial system.  
 
In examining regulatory approaches to systemic risk, one should also 
take into account the costs of regulation. There are direct costs, such as 
hiring government employees to monitor and enforce the regulations. But 
more importantly there can be indirect costs, such as overregulation that 
stifles innovation and competitiveness. 
 
Subject to that caveat, consider the following possible regulatory 
approaches. 
 
Averting Panics. The ideal regulatory approach would aim to 
eliminate the risk of systemic collapse from the outset. Theoretically this 
goal could be achieved by preventing financial panics, since they are often 
the triggers that commence a chain of failures. The global financial crisis 
itself, for example, was initially triggered by financial market panic. Any 
regulation aimed at preventing panics that trigger systemic risk, however, 
could fail to anticipate all the causes of the panics. Furthermore, even when 
identified, panics cannot always be averted easily because investors are not 
always rational.  
 
Requiring Increased Disclosure. Another potential regulatory 
approach is to improve disclosure. Disclosing risks traditionally has been 
viewed, at least under U.S. and most foreign securities laws, as the primary 
market-regulatory mechanism. It works by reducing, if not eliminating, 
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asymmetric information among market players, making the risks transparent 
to all.  
 
In the context of systemic risk, however, individual market 
participants who fully understand that risk will be motivated to protect 
themselves but not the system as a whole.  
 
Furthermore, the efficacy of disclosure is limited by the increasing 
complexity of transactions and markets—complexity being, I believe, the 
greatest 21
st
 Century challenge for our financial system. In the recent 
financial crisis, for example, there is little question that virtually everything 
was disclosed regarding the complex mortgage-backed securities. Yet many 
institutional investors bought these securities based primarily on their 
ratings, without fully understanding them.  
 
There are a host of reasons why this occurred. (i) Analysts overrelied 
on heuristics such as rating-agency ratings. (ii) Analysts and investors 
followed the herd in their investment choices. (iii) Conflicts of interest were 
driven by short-term management compensation schemes, especially for 
technically sophisticated secondary managers (and tomorrow I‟ll discuss 
how mathematical modeling, like value-at-risk (VaR), contributed to this); 
this is a conflict unlike the traditional focus of scholars and politicians on 
conflicts between senior managers and shareholders. (iv) The retention by 
underwriters of residual risk portions may have fostered false confidence in 
buyers, in effect creating a mutual misunderstanding; this could be 
exacerbated in the future by the political solution that sellers retain a 
minimum unhedged position in each class of securities they sell. 
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Requiring increased disclosure would therefore do little to reduce 
systemic risk. We should, however, address the conflicts of interest that are 
inherent in short-term compensation structures, especially of secondary 
managers.   
 
Imposing Financial-Exposure Limits.  The failure of one or more 
large institutions could create defaults large enough to de-stabilize other 
highly-leveraged investors, increasing the likelihood of a systemic market 
meltdown. This suggests another possible approach to regulation: placing 
limits on an institution‟s financial exposure.  
 
These limits could be imposed in various ways, such as (i) limiting an 
institution‟s leverage; (ii) limiting an institution‟s right to make risky 
investments, such as the so-called Volker Rule‟s proposal to limit 
proprietary trading; and (iii) limiting amounts of inter-institution exposure. 
Consider each in turn.  
 
(i) Limiting an institution‟s leverage could reduce the risk that an 
institution fails in the first place. It also could reduce the likelihood of 
transmitting financial contagion between institutions. But limiting leverage 
can create significant costs. Some leverage is good, and there is no optimal 
across-the-board amount of leverage that is right for every institution. 
 
(ii) Limiting an institution‟s right to make investments is a highly 
paternalistic approach, substituting a blanket regulatory prescription for a 
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firm‟s own business judgment. In general, I would be highly skeptical of any 
rule that attempts to protect a sophisticated financial institution from itself.  
 
(iii) Inter-institution financial-exposure limits would facilitate stability 
by diversifying risk, in effect by reducing the losses of any given contractual 
counterparty and thus the likelihood that such losses would cause the 
counterparty to fail. Limits also might reduce the urgency, and hence the 
panic, that contractual counterparties feel about closing out their positions. 
 
This approach already applies to banks through lending limits, which 
restrict the amount of bank exposure to any given customer‟s risk. Its 
application beyond banks to other financial institutions is potentially 
appealing given the increasing blurring of lines between banks and non-bank 
financial institutions and the high volumes of financial assets circulating 
among non-bank financial entities.  
 
It is questionable, though, whether the government should impose 
financial exposure limits on institutions. Large financial institutions already 
try to protect themselves through risk management and risk mitigation. The 
financial crisis has raised questions, though, whether conflicts of interest 
among managers and other failures can undermine institutional risk 
management.  
 
Limiting Financial Institution Size.  This is related to financial 
exposure limits; but here there is also the moral-hazard potential that 
institutions who believe they are “too big to fail” will engage in risky 
projects. There is, however, no clear evidence of such risky behavior, and 
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financial institutional losses in the global financial crisis can all be explained 
by other reasons. (I later argue that a privately-funded systemic risk fund can 
minimize even the potential for such risky behavior.)  
 
I would caution against artificially limiting financial institution size. 
Size should be governed by the economies of scale and scope needed for 
institutions to successfully compete, domestically and abroad—so long as 
that size is manageable. We should watch out, however, for institutions that 
increase their size, especially by acquisition of other institutions, primarily 
to satisfy senior management egos. That is yet another reason why 
management compensation should, ideally, be tied to long-term results.  
 
Ensuring Liquidity.  Ensuring liquidity could facilitate stability in two 
ways: by providing liquidity to prevent financial institutions from defaulting, 
and by providing liquidity to capital markets as necessary to keep them 
functioning.  
 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank has had the role of 
providing liquidity to prevent financial institutions from defaulting, by 
acting as a lender of last resort. Acting as a lender of last resort to 
institutions can be costly, however. By providing a lifeline, a lender of last 
resort can at least theoretically foster moral hazard by encouraging financial 
institutions—especially those that believe they are “too big to fail”—to be 
fiscally reckless. It also can shift costs to taxpayers since loans made to 
institutions will not be repaid if the institutions eventually fail. For these 
reasons, the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. sharply limits the power of the 
Federal Reserve to make emergency loans to individual or insolvent 
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financial institutions. I regard that categorical limitation as perverse; a lender 
of last resort can be an important safeguard if used judiciously. 
 
Regardless of how one views a lender of last resort to financial 
institutions, the global financial crisis has shown that, in an era of 
disintermediation, more attention needs to be focused on providing liquidity 
to capital markets as necessary to keep them functioning. This approach 
should also be less costly than lending to institutions. A market liquidity 
provider of last resort, especially if it acts at the outset of a market panic, can 
profitably invest in securities at a deep discount from the market price and 
still provide a “floor” to how low the market will drop. Buying at a deep 
discount will mitigate moral hazard and also make it likely that the market 
liquidity provider will be repaid.  
 
One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can 
invest at a deep discount to stabilize markets and still make money, private 
investors won‟t also do so, thereby eliminating the need for some sort of 
governmental market liquidity provider. One answer is that individuals at 
investing firms will not want to jeopardize their reputations (and jobs) by 
causing their firms to invest at a time when other investors have abandoned 
the market. Another answer is that private investors usually want to buy and 
sell securities, not waiting for their maturities, whereas a market liquidity 
provider of last resort should be able to wait until maturity, if necessary.  
 
Ad Hoc Approaches.  The cost and effectiveness of ad hoc, or purely 
reactive, regulatory responses to systemic risk are, of course, partly 
dependent on what those responses turn out to be. Ad hoc approaches do not 
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always work. Sometimes they are too late and the harm has been done or no 
longer can be prevented, and sometimes there is insufficient time to fashion 
and implement an optimal solution.  
 
But ad hoc approaches should not be dismissed out of hand. They can 
help to minimize the difficulties in measuring, and balancing, costs and 
benefits; and they can reduce moral-hazard cost to the extent an institution 
cannot know in advance whether, if it faces financial failure, it will be bailed 
out or fail.  
 
Market Discipline.  Under a market-discipline approach, the 
regulator‟s job is to ensure that market participants exercise the type of 
diligence that enables the market to work efficiently. This was the type of 
approach taken by the United States government under the second Bush 
administration. 
 
Textbooks claim that perfect markets would never need external 
regulation, thereby providing support for a market-discipline approach. 
However actual markets, including financial markets, are not perfect. 
Furthermore, as illustrated by the tragedy of the commons, a firm can lack 
sufficient incentive to limit its risk taking in order to reduce the danger of 
systemic contagion for other firms.  
 
The financial crisis dramatically confirms that market discipline alone 
cannot always prevent systemic risk.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
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Of the regulatory approaches identified so far, I would recommend at 
least two: ensure that managers (including secondary managers) of financial 
institutions are compensated based on long-term firm performance; and 
establish a market liquidity provider of last resort. 
 
Let me expand on the latter recommendation. A market liquidity 
provider of last resort would have the best chance of minimizing a systemic 
collapse under any number of circumstances. But to be successful, it must be 
made operational in advance of a market collapse, which can occur rapidly 
and without warning.  
 
Chaos theory supports the concept of a market liquidity provider of 
last resort. In complex engineering systems, failures are inevitable. 
Therefore modularity is needed to break the transmission of these failures 
and limit their systemic consequences. Such a mechanism usually exists for 
banks (a liquidity provider of last resort); we also need one for complex 
financial markets. 
 
Recent experience in the financial crisis supports establishment of a 
market liquidity provider of last resort. In response to the collapse of the 
commercial paper market, the U.S. Federal Reserve created the Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to act as a lender of last resort for that 
market, with the goal of addressing “temporary liquidity distortions” by 
purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not 
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otherwise sell their paper.
2
 The CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the 
commercial paper market.
3
 
 
I also would recommend a third regulatory approach: in response to 
the tragedy-of-the-commons problem, to require financial institutions of 
systemic significance to contribute to a fund that would be used to mitigate 
systemic externalities—such as by funding the market liquidity provider or 
providing bank bailout monies. This approach was originally in the Dodd-
Frank Act, but it was taken out at the last minute because of opposition by 
politicians who believed (in my opinion, wrongly) that it would increase 
moral hazard by institutionalizing bailouts.  
 
A privately-funded systemic risk fund not only can mitigate systemic 
externalities but also can help minimize the potential for risky behavior 
caused by institutions that believe they are too big to fail. The too-big-to-fail 
problem is effectively an externality imposed on government (and ultimately 
taxpayers) by an institution engaging in such risky behavior. A privately-
funded systemic risk fund would help to internalize that externality. 
Furthermore, the ability of government to require additional contributions to 
this type of fund should motivate contributors to the fund to monitor each 
other to reduce the potential for such risky behavior.  
 
Recently, the European Commission has been toying with the idea of 
a systemic risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax the financial 
                                                 
2
 See Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough, & Dina Marchioni, „The Federal Reserve‟s 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility,” FRBNY Econ. Policy Rev. (forthcoming). 
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sector. Although the ultimate use of the tax revenues is currently unresolved, 
news reports indicate that an originally contemplated use was a systemic risk 
fund. The IMF also appears to be using the European Commission tax 
proposal as a platform to announce that „new taxes on banks [are] needed to 
provide an insurance fund for future financial meltdowns and to curb 
excessive risktaking.‟4  
 
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 
 
Because financial markets and institutions increasingly cross 
sovereign borders, any regulatory approaches must be designed to work in 
an international context. We should consider (a) the feasibility of 
internationally regulating systemic risk, (b) the extent to which a market 
liquidity provider of last resort or other regulatory solutions are universal or 
should be different for different countries, and (c) the potential for a 
regulatory race to the bottom, international regulatory arbitrage, or even 
undermining national competitiveness if regulation is done only on a 
national level. For example, the European Commission recognizes that to 
avoid making the EU financial sector uncompetitive, any tax on the financial 
sector should be applied in all financial centres.  
 
SOVEREIGN DEBT ISSUES RELATING TO SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
3
 Id. at 11 (concluding that “[t]he CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the commercial 
paper market”). 
4
 Larry Elliott & Jill Treanor, IMF: Supervise and Tax Banks or Risk Crisis, THE 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2010, at 25 (London-final ed.) (paraphrasing an announcement by 
IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn). 
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Any discussion of the global financial crisis and systemic risk should 
also address the problem of sovereign debt restructuring. Even relatively 
small nations, like Greece, can be seen as too big to fail if their default could 
trigger wider economic collapse. As a result, they are often bailed out.  
 
Bailouts can foster true moral hazard because nations, unlike financial 
institutions, cannot be liquidated, and governments have strong political 
incentives to avoid reducing services or raising taxes. The Greek 
government, for example, did little to impose fiscal austerity even as debts 
accumulated. Furthermore, bailouts are terribly expensive—in the case of 
Greece costing potentially hundreds of billions of euros. 
 
This is a growing problem: as global capital markets increasingly (and 
inevitably) embrace sovereign bonds, the potential for a country‟s debt 
default to trigger a larger systemic collapse becomes even more tightly 
linked. 
 
The alternative to a bailout is an orderly debt restructuring, but that‟s 
usually impractical because of two market failures: a holdout problem, and a 
funding problem. The holdout problem is that any given creditor has an 
incentive to strategically hold out from agreeing to a reasonable debt-
restructuring plan, hoping that the imperative of others to settle will 
persuade them to allocate the holdout more than its fair share of the 
settlement or purchase the holdout‟s claim.5 The funding problem is that a 
                                                 
5
 This problem was playfully illustrated in the 1999 British movie, Waking Ned Devine. 
Devine, an elderly man in a remote Irish village, wins the national lottery but 
immediately dies of shock (without heirs). The townspeople want to have one of their 
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country is likely to need to borrow new money to pay critical expenses 
during the debt restructuring process but no lender is likely to be willing to 
lend such funds unless its right to repayment has priority over existing debt 
claims. Any effective solution to the sovereign debt dilemma would have to 
address these two problems.  
 
Addressing the Holdout Problem 
The holdout problem can be addressed by legislating, through 
international treaty, a form of “super-majority” voting on sovereign debt-
restructuring plans, in which the vote by the overwhelming majority of 
similarly situated creditors can bind dissenting creditors. This is the tried-
and-true method by which insolvency law, including Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, successfully and equitably addresses the holdout problem 
in a corporate context and achieves consensual debt restructuring. Because 
only similarly situated creditors can vote to bind dissenting creditors, and 
because any outcome of voting will bind all those creditors alike, the 
outcomes of votes should benefit the claims of holdouts and dissenters as 
much as the claims of the super-majority. 
 
The IMF actually proposed, some years back, a sovereign debt 
restructuring convention similar to this, based on scholarly research of the 
problem (including my own research). The convention was never adopted, 
however, because of political opposition in the United States by the second 
Bush Administration, apparently based on philosophical dogma that free-
                                                                                                                                                 
own impersonate him, thereby receiving the lottery money—which would be split evenly 
among the residents. But one resident threatens to reveal the ruse to the authorities unless 
she receives a disproportionately high share. 
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market solutions always ought to trump legislative ones. They instead 
favored solving the holdout problem contractually through what are referred 
to as collective-action clauses, allowing essential payment terms of a loan 
facility to be changed through super-majority, as opposed to unanimous, 
voting.  
 
There are, however, two fundamental problems with collective-action 
clauses. First, collective-action clauses are not always included in sovereign 
loan and bond agreements. In the Greek debt crisis, for example, 90 percent 
of the total debt was not governed by collective-action clauses. Second, even 
if every sovereign loan and bond agreement included collective-action 
clauses, those clauses only work on an agreement-by-agreement basis. 
Therefore, any one or more syndicate of banks or group of bondholders that 
fails to achieve a super-majority vote would itself be a holdout vis-à-vis 
other creditors. It therefore is unlikely that collective-action clauses can ever 
effectively resolve the holdout problem in sovereign-debt restructuring.  
 
I therefore believe that an international convention, in which super-
majority voting can bind all of a nation‟s creditors, is needed to solve the 
holdout problem. 
 
Addressing the Funding Problem 
Such a convention could also address the funding problem. A simple 
remedy would be to grant a first priority right of repayment to loans of new 
money made to enable a country to pay critical expenses during the debt 
restructuring process. Existing creditors can be protected by giving them the 
right to object to a new-money loan if its amount is too high or its terms are 
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inappropriate. Existing creditors will also be further protected because a 
country that abuses new-money lending privileges will be unlikely to receive 
super-majority creditor approval for a debt-restructuring plan.  
 
 Consensus and Disputes 
Once these market failures have been addressed, the remainder of the 
sovereign debt restructuring process can be consensual. A consensual 
process would not undermine the rule of law, as would an attempt by a 
nation to impose a “haircut” on its bonds such as by unilaterally reducing the 
principal amount of the bonds or the rate of interest payable thereunder. Nor 
should a consensual restructuring increase borrowing costs for other nations. 
Indeed, a nation whose debt has been consensually restructured should itself 
be able to borrow new money at attractive rates.  
 
Nor would a sovereign debt restructuring process need to depend on 
the creation of a “bankruptcy” court or other costly institutional arbiter. 
Indeed, the experience of corporate debt restructuring in the United States 
under Chapter 11 confirms that the parties themselves do most of the 
negotiating. When parties cannot reach agreement on issues, a relatively 
low-cost and straightforward procedure already exists under international 
law for this purpose. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous body created under the auspices of the 
World Bank, provides facilities for arbitration of investment disputes. The 
ICSID arbitration procedure is well established, commonly used, and widely 
accepted, and it should be a useful model to the extent that a tribunal is 
needed to resolve sovereign debt restructuring disputes. 
